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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

quire an immediate legislative response, but limiting the right to counsel to matrimonial actions"6 would only produce another "patch" in
the already inadequate and disorganized legislative schema.
A true reform would more likely result from a combination of
Judge Fuchsberg's dissent and the Menin decision. If the Court of
Appeals were to declare that attorneys had a constitutional right to
adequate compensation for their services and that indigents in all
proceedings, criminal, civil, and administrative, had a right to be represented by counsel, the legislature would be forced to develop an
organized, comprehensive program insuring that all litigants - without
regard to financial status - would have their claims effectively presented. A bold step towards creating true "equal justice under law,"
this solution would enhance the probability of a decision based on the
merits of the claim, rather than on the financial resources of the
claimant.
ARTICLE 12-INFANTS AND INCOMPETENTS

CPLR 1209: Permission for submitting infant's claim to arbitration
may be obtained at any time prior to commencement of arbitration
hearings.
CPLR 1209 provides that when a controversy involves an infant
a court order must be obtained by the infant's representative before
that controversy can be submitted to arbitration. 87 The Court of Appeals, in Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Stekardis,88 has allowed an infant's
representative greater flexibility in complying with the provisions of
that statute.
Stekardis involved a motor vehicle accident claim against Aetna,
holder of the liability insurance policy on the Stekardis car.8 9 Claims
86 See note 71 supra.
87 Section 2365 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly forbade the submission to
arbitration of any controversy involving an infant party. Ch. 178, § 2365, [1880] N.Y. Laws

298. When this section was later incorporated into the CPA, its character as an absolute

prohibition was preserved. Ch. 925, § 1410, [1920] N.Y. Laws 473-74 (renumbered § 1448
by Ch. 199, § 14, [1921] N.Y. Laws 801-02). In 1937, the legislature amended CPA 1448 to
allow the guardian of an infant party to petition the court for permission to submit the
controversy to arbitration. Ch. 341, § 1448, [1937] N.Y. Laws 203. The amended CPA 1448
eventually became what is presently CPLR 1209. Ch. 308, § 1209, [1962] N.Y. Laws 650.
88 34 N.Y.2d 182p 313 N.E.2d 53, 356 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1974).
89Id. at 184, 313 N.E.2d at 53, 856 N.Y.S.2d at 588. An unidentified truck collided
with an automobile in front of the Stekardis car, causing a piece of furniture to fall from
the truck. In the confusion, the Stekardis car struck another vehicle. On the theory that
the truck had caused the accident, the claimants sought recovery under the "uninsured
motorist" endorsement contained in the Stekardis policy. The New York Insurance Law
mandates that every motor vehicle insurance policy contain such a provision, protecting
the insured in the event he suffers damages as a result of an accident with an uninsured or
unidentified motor vehicle. N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(2-a) (McKinney 1966).
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were brought by the driver-owner of the car and his three passengers,
two of whom were infants. All the claimants demanded arbitration. 0°
Aetna moved to stay the arbitration, asserting, as one of several reasons,
the failure of the infants' representatives to obtain a court order in
compliance with CPLR 1209.91 The lower courts denied Aetna's motion,9 2 and appeal was taken.
In a unanimous decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial
of the motion to stay arbitration, 3 holding that the representatives'
failure to obtain the requisite court permission prior to demanding
arbitration was "not fatal" to their cause of action.ta Rather, the Court
permitted the arbitration to proceed, requiring only that the infants'
representatives comply with CPLR 1209 before the actual arbitration
hearings begin.9 5
Stekardis marks a significant departure from earlier New York case
law. Prior to that decision it was generally thought that "[u]nder CPLR
1209... a court order must be obtained before a controversy involving
an infant.., can be submitted to arbitration."9 6 In cases decided under
90 Pursuant to the authority conferred on it by § 606(b) of the Insurance Law, the
Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) has promulgated regulations which provide that each "uninsured motorist" endorsement, see note 91 supra, must
contain a specific clause requiring arbitration either between the insurer and the insured
or between MVAIC and a claimant if the parties fail to agree either as to the right to
recover or as to damages. See generally 11 N.Y.C.R.R. 60 (1961).
9134 N.Y.2d at 184, 313 N.E.2d at 53-54, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 588. Two other grounds for
staying arbitration were asserted by Aetna. First, it claimed that the notice it received
concerning arbitration was defective since the respondents did not list the addresses of all
adult claimants. Second, Aetna argued that the asserted claims did not fall within the
policy coverage. Id.
92 Special Term denied the motion on the ground that all of the plaintiffs' claims were
covered by the insurance policy, while the Appellate Division, First Department, based its
denial solely on the ground that Aetna had failed to make a timely motion to stay
arbitration under CPLR 7503(c). 43 App. Div. 2d 682, 350 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150 (Ist Dep't 1973).
The First Department made no mention of the failure of the infants' representatives to
obtain a court order approving the submission of the infants' claims to arbitration. Id.
In his dissent, however, Justice McGivern noted the absence of such a court order from
the record. Id. at 683, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 151 (McGivern, J., dissenting).
93 34 N.Y.2d at 186-87, 313 NE.2d at 55, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 590. The Court based its
decision primarily on the fact that Aetna, which had failed to make a timely motion to
stay arbitration under CPLR 7503(c), could not obtain the relief afforded by the statute
via a tardy motion. Id. at 185-86, 313 N.E2d at 54-55, 356 N.Y.S2d at 589-90. CPLR
7503(c), which had required that the motion be made within 10 days of receipt of the
notice of intention to arbitrate, has since been amended to afford a party 20 days in
which to make such motion. CPLR 7503(c), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1974).
94 34 N.Y.2d at 186, 313 NXE.2d at 55, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 590.
95 Id.

96 2 WK&M 1 1209.01 (emphasis added). The legislative history of CPLR 1209 is not
inconsistent with this view. See note 87 supra. The New York Legislature's initial reluctance to permit arbitration of infants' claims appears to support, if anything, a strict
interpretation of the requirement that court approval be obtained before any steps towards
arbitration are taken.
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both CPLR 120997 and its predecessor provision in the CPA,98 the
courts adopted a literal interpretation of the statute, construing the
statutory provision as a requirement to be satisfied before any steps
towards arbitration could be taken. Accordingly, these courts readily
granted motions to stay an order of arbitration on the ground that the
infant-plaintiffs' representatives had failed to secure a court order permitting arbitration of the claim.
By its decision in Stekardis, the Court of Appeals has altered the
impact of CPLR 1209 on arbitration proceedings involving an infant.
No longer a prerequisite to the commencement of arbitration, CPLR
1209 has become merely a condition to be satisfied at any time before
the actual hearings begin. As a result, an infant-plaintiff's representative
now has the option of either obtaining a court order under CPLR 1209
before arbitration is commenced or serving notice of intention to
arbitrate before any permission of the court is sought. He can proceed
in the manner he deems most expeditious and advantageous.
The Court of Appeals, in the Stekardis decision, did not express
dissatisfaction with the provisions of CPLR 1209. Yet, in refusing to
give the statute a literal reading, the Court intimated that compliance
with CPLR 1209 is little more than a technicality. The danger inherent
in this interpretation is that it may lead courts to neglect their duty,
as guardians, to protect the infant's best interests. Judicial scrutiny of
the propriety of submitting an infant's claim to arbitration should not
97 See Coughlin v. MVAIC, 45 Misc. 2d 672, 257 N.Y.S.2d 549, 551 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1965), where the court granted a motion for an order to stay arbitration in light
of the infant-claimants' failure to obtain court permission prior to submission of the
claims to arbitration. See also Frame v. MVAIC, 31 App. Div. 2d 872, 297 N.Y.S.2d 247
(3d Dep't) (mem.), modified, 32 App. Div. 2d 572, 300 N.YS.2d 542 (3d Dep't 1969) (mem.),
overruled on other grounds, 34 N.Y.2d 182, 313 N.E.2d 53, 356 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1974). The
main issue in Frame was whether the insurer was precluded from raising objections
concerning the insured's coverage because he had failed to make a timely motion to stay
arbitration pursuant to CPLR 7503(c). 31 App. Div. 2d at 873, 297 N.YS.2d at 249. In
reversing the order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration, the court held that
the insurer was not precluded from raising such objections. Id. The court noted that an
additional reason for its decision was "an issue not raised by any of the parties," viz, the
absence from the record of a court order permitting the infant's representative to submit
the claim to arbitration. Id. at 873, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 249-50. In a third case, Klein v.
MVAIC, 48 Misc. 2d 82, 264 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Sup. CL N.Y. County 1965), the court granted
defendant's motion to stay arbitration on the ground that the case involved certain issues
of fact which had to be tried in court. Id. at 84, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 270. The court noted
that should these issues be decided in plaintiff's favor, plaintiff-parents would still have
to apply for a court order pursuant to CPLR 1209 prior to submission of the plaintiffinfants' claims to arbitration. Id.
98 See Chernick v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 8 App. Div. 2d 264, 187 N.Y.S.2d
534 (3d Dep't 1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 756, 168 N.E.d 110, 201 N.Y.S.2d 774 (1960), an early
landmark case holding that the requirements of CPA 1448 (now CPLR 1209) must be met
before an infant can arbitrate his claim.
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be discouraged, especially since an arbitrator's award is not subject to
judicial review on the merits 9 and the arbitration agreement may
provide for a ceiling on the amount recoverable which is unrelated to
the damages sustained. 00 It is only hoped that Stekardis' liberalization
of CPLR 1209 will not encourage courts, impressed with the time and
energy already expended in preparation for arbitration, to more readily
grant orders permitting arbitration without fully investigating to determine whether this avenue is truly the best method of settling the infant's
claim.
ARTICLE

30-

REMEDIES AND PLEADNGS

CPLR 3022 & 3026: Remedy for defectively verified pleading is to
treat it as a nullity; plaintiff State not prejudiced where prosecution
for perjury is precluded.
According to CPLR 3022, a defectively verified pleading may be
treated as a nullity provided notice with due diligence' 0' is given to the
adverse party. Such notice must specify the reasons for which the plead10 2
ing is returned.
In State v. McMahon,103 New York State sought to recover, in a
civil action, money which had been fraudulently procured by the
defendant. 0 4 By verified complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant
entered into a conspiracy to, and did, forge and cash two lottery tickets
in the amount of $55,000, $41,700 of which had already been recouped
by plaintiff State. Defendant served an unverified answer, asserting his
privilege against self-incrimination as the basis therefor. 105 By an order
99 See Raisler Corp. v. New York City Housing Auth., 82 N.Y.2d 274, 282, 298 N.E.2d
91, 94-95, 844 N.Y.S.2d 917, 928 (1973); In re Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494, 496-97, 62 N.E. 575,
576 (1902).
100 Coughlin v. MVIAC, 45 Misc. 2d 672, 674, 257 N.Y.S.2d 549, 552 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1965) (dictum).
101 See Westchester Life, Inc. v. Westchester Magazine Co., 85 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. CL

N.Y. County 1948) where due diligence was held to require, inter alia, notice within 24
hours. Notice must be issued before trial, in any event, to permit cure of the defect by
amendment. 8 WK&M 8022.03.
102 Westchester Life, Inc. v. Westchester Magazine Co., 85 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. CL N.Y.
County 1948). "It is well settled that a notice accompanying an answer returned for
improper verification or lack of verification must state the defects relied upon specifically,
and that a general statement is not enough." Id. Where insuffcient notice is given to the
adverse party, it is as if the pleading had not been returned at all. Id.; see 7B McKINNEY'S
CPLR 8022, commentary at 397 (1974); 8 WK&M 3022.08 ("[A] statement that the pleading failed to meet the statutory requirements is insufficient.").
103 78 Misc. 2d 388, 356 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1974).
'04 Defendant and others were indicted for the forgery and cashing of two lottery
tickets in the amount of $55,000. Defendant pleaded guilty to forgery in the second degree
in satisfaction of the indictment, Id. at 388, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
105 CPLR 3020(a) states that "where a pleading is verified, each subsequent pleading
[with certain exceptions] shall also be verified." One exemption from the burden of
verification is as to matter to "which the party would be privileged from testifying as a

